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DISCRIMINATION IN ONLINE EMPLOYMENT RECRUITING 
PAULINE T. KIM* AND SHARION SCOTT** 
ABSTRACT 
Employment recruitment is increasingly moving online as employers use 
Facebook and other social media platforms to advertise job opportunities. This 
shift to online advertising allows employers to more precisely target workers 
likely to apply, but also raises concerns about unfair exclusion. This essay 
explains the mechanisms through which online recruiting can produce 
discriminatory effects and examines the question of when employers will be 
liable under existing employment discrimination laws. Both Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act contain little-
noticed provisions that specifically forbid discriminatory advertising, in 
addition to their general prohibitions on taking adverse employment actions 
because of a protected characteristic. We examine whether or how these 
provisions might apply to online targeted advertising and also whether 
employers’ recruiting practices might support claims of disparate treatment or 
disparate impact discrimination. We conclude that ample room exists within 
existing doctrine to address the most egregious practices; however, it is less 
certain whether current law is adequate to reach all forms of targeted 
recruitment with significant discriminatory effects. 
  
 
* Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When Mark Edelstein scrolled through his Facebook newsfeed one day, he 
was unaware that there were job postings he was not seeing. He saw ads for 
software he could purchase or websites he could use to book travel, but positions 
at companies such as HubSpot were not visible to him because they had chosen 
to advertise only to certain groups, such as “people ages 27 to 40.”1 Edelstein, 
who was fifty-eight at the time, was not in the audience targeted to receive those 
advertisements even though he was searching for employment.2 
As Edelstein’s experience suggests, employer recruiting practices have 
undergone a seismic shift. Not too long ago, when employers sought to recruit 
new employees, they could advertise the job opening in a newspaper or other 
media outlet, distribute flyers, engage an employment agency, attend a job fair, 
or simply ask their current employees if they knew of anyone who might be 
interested.3 Some of these methods—particularly word-of-mouth recruitment—
tended to limit the pool of workers who would learn of the opportunity.4 But the 
most commonly used formal methods of recruitment, like newspaper 
advertisements, were potentially accessible to all interested persons. Today, 
employment recruiting is increasingly moving onto social media platforms like 
Facebook. Recent surveys show a clear upward trend in online recruiting.5 In 
2015, an overwhelming majority of employers surveyed—eighty-four percent—
 
 1. Julia Angwin, Noam Scheiber & Ariana Tobin, Dozens of Companies Are Using Facebook 
to Exclude Older Workers from Job Ads, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2017, 5:45 PM), https://www.prop 
ublica.org/article/facebook-ads-age-discrimination-targeting [https://perma.cc/B356-KYRJ]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See F. Carson Mencken & Idee Winfield, Employer Recruiting and the Gender 
Composition of Jobs, 32 SOC. FOCUS 201, 202 (1999). 
 4. Id. at 203–04 (discussing how informal recruiting limits employment opportunities for 
certain groups but more formal advertising reaches a wider audience). 
 5. The Society for Human Resource Management conducts biennial surveys of job recruiters. 
The surveys demonstrated an increase in the use of online recruiting by employers, rising from 
fifty-six percent in 2011 to seventy-seven percent in 2013 to eighty-four percent in 2015. SHRM 
Survey Findings: Social Networking Websites and Recruiting/Selection, SOC. FOR HUM. RESOURCE 
MGMT. 2 (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-sur 
veys/Pages/shrm-social-networking-websites-recruiting-job-candidates.aspx [https://perma.cc/6E 
3B-2D3L]; SHRM Survey Findings: Using Social Media for Talent Acquisition—Recruitment and 
Screening, SOC. FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 3 (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/ 
trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Documents/SHRM-Social-Media-Recruiting-Screen 
ing-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/A523-99VX]. See also Jobvite’s New 2015 Recruiter Nation Survey 
Reveals Talent Crunch, JOBVITE (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.jobvite.com/news_item/jobvites-
new-2015-recruiter-nation-survey-reveals-talent-crunch-95-recruiters-anticipate-similar-increas 
ed-competition-skilled-workers-coming-year-86-expect-exp [https://perma.cc/72TY-HW3J]; 
Kimberlee Morrison, Survey: 92% of Recruiters Use Social Media to Find High-Quality 
Candidates, ADWEEK, (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.adweek.com/digital/survey-96-of-recruiters-
use-social-media-to-find-high-quality-candidates/ [https://perma.cc/8F7E-AH4D]. 
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reported using social media to recruit,6 and the proportion has likely gone up 
since then. 
Facebook is not alone in allowing recruiters to target a demographically 
restricted audience. The very premise of online advertising is that it can precisely 
target viewers based on their interests, preferences, and characteristics. Google, 
LinkedIn, and other platforms also encourage advertisers to use personal 
attributes to choose who can see their ads, as well as who will be excluded.7 
Employers value these tools because they can deploy their recruiting dollars 
strategically, targeting ads to those who are most likely to have relevant skills 
and to actually apply.  
The shift to online recruiting raises concerns about unfair exclusion. In a 
series of articles, ProPublica reported on the potential for advertisers to exclude 
certain racial groups from receiving their online ads.8 Several lawsuits were 
subsequently filed alleging that Facebook unlawfully permitted discriminatory 
advertising.9 The issue of whether online platforms should be liable for 
facilitating discriminatory conduct is a vexing one, involving questions about 
what constitutes discriminatory conduct as well as when the platforms are 
entitled to immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.10 
A number of cases and articles have explored these questions in some depth.11 
 
 6. SHRM Survey Findings: Using Social Media for Talent Acquisition—Recruitment and 
Screening, supra note 5, at 3. 
 7. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, AARP and Key Senators Urge Companies to End Age Bias 
in Recruiting on Facebook, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/arti 
cle/aarp-and-key-senators-urge-companies-to-end-age-bias-in-recruiting-on-facebook [https://per 
ma.cc/6ND8-GEGW]. 
 8. Julia Angwin & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-
advertisers-exclude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/B8YC-LJYM]; Julia Angwin, Facebook Says 
it Will Stop Allowing Some Advertisers to Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 11, 2016, 
10:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-to-stop-allowing-some-advertisers-to-ex 
clude-users-by-race [https://perma.cc/E87K-LWJW]; Julia Angwin, Ariana Tobin & Madeleine 
Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 
21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-hous 
ing-race-sex-national-origin [https://perma.cc/84QT-GUGV]. 
 9. Onuoha v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD, 2016 WL 6599689, para. 2 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 9, 2018) (class action lawsuit against Facebook for engaging in a pattern-or-practice of 
providing racially discriminatory advertising for employers, creditors, and housing providers, in 
violation of multiple civil rights laws); Bradley v. T-Mobile, No. 5:17-cv-07232, 2017 WL 
6539268, para. 1–2, 10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2018); Nat’l Fair Housing Alliance v. Facebook, Inc., 
No. 1:18-cv-02689, 2018 WL 1505634, para. 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2018) (fair housing lawsuit 
against Facebook for enabling housing advertisers to exclude certain groups on the basis of 
protected traits). 
 10. Communications Decency Act of 1934 § 230, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 11. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Amit Datta, Anupam Datta, Jael Makagon, Deirdre K. Mulligan, Michael Carl Tschantz, 
Discrimination in Online Advertising: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING 
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This Article examines the distinct but related question of employer liability. 
Our focus is thus on the underexplored question of when employers should be 
liable for discrimination based on their online recruiting strategies. These 
questions were raised in Bradley v. T-Mobile,12 a lawsuit filed in December 
2017, which claims that employers such as T-Mobile, Amazon, Cox 
Communications, and Hubspot are using Facebook’s advertising tools in ways 
that violate federal and state age discrimination laws.13 The complaint alleges 
that these employers exclude older workers from receiving information about 
job opportunities by using advertisements targeted on the basis of age.14 As 
explained below, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196415 and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”)16 both contain little-noticed 
provisions that specifically forbid discriminatory advertising17 in addition to 
their general prohibitions on taking adverse employment actions because of a 
protected characteristic. We consider various theories for holding employers 
liable for their advertising and recruitment practices, and conclude that ample 
room exists within existing doctrine to address the most egregious practices. 
Whether current law is adequate to reach all practices with significant 
discriminatory effects is less certain. 
We begin in Part II by explaining how employers can recruit candidates 
online and why these strategies may sometimes discriminate based on race, sex, 
age, or other traits currently protected by law. In Part III, we analyze the sparse 
legal authority interpreting the prohibitions on discriminatory advertising in the 
context of newspaper advertisements. We also review cases that relied on 
discriminatory recruitment practices as evidence of disparate treatment or 
disparate impact liability. In Part IV, we apply that authority to online 
recruitment practices, considering the extent to which existing law can address 
concerns about discriminatory exclusion. 
 
RES. 1, 2 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/datta18a/datta18a.pdf [https://perma.cc/48YJ-7 
C5E] 
 12. Bradley, 2017 WL 6539268, para. 1–22. 
 13. Press Release, Commc’n Workers of America, Class Action Lawsuit Hits T-Mobile, 
Amazon, Cox and Hundreds of Large Employers for Allegedly Using Facebook to Exclude Millions 
of Older Americans from Job Ads in Violation of Age Discrimination Laws (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.cwa-union.org/news/releases/class-action-lawsuit-hits-tmobile-amazon-cox-for-al 
leged-age-discrimination [https://perma.cc/GM36-AB8M]. The lawsuit was filed with both a 
plaintiff class that includes older workers and a defendant class of hundreds of companies that 
utilize targeted advertising. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 703-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2012). 
 16. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 §§ 2-12, 14-15, 17, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–
634 (2012). 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012). 
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II.  ONLINE EMPLOYMENT RECRUITING PRACTICES 
The power of online recruiting lies in the ability it gives employers to 
precisely target specific audiences. By directing their employment ads at the 
most plausible and desirable candidates, they can save money and effort. While 
targeted advertising enables more efficient outreach, it may also open the door 
to the discriminatory delivery of ads. This part explains that risk, focusing 
primarily on Facebook to illustrate the mechanics of the ad targeting process. 
Like other internet platforms, Facebook systematically collects large 
amounts of data about users’ activities on the site, such as who their friends are, 
when they “like” something, and what links they click.18 Facebook also 
purchases information from data brokers to learn about users’ offline behavior, 
including income and spending habits.19 All of this data is aggregated and 
analyzed to sort and categorize users. Studies estimate that Facebook uses tens 
or perhaps hundreds of thousands of unique attributes to classify its users20—
categories ranging from people who have expressed an interest in cats to expats 
who lived in Bangladesh. Facebook uses all this data to help advertisers identify 
the specific types of people they want to receive their ads.21 They can choose to 
target or exclude people from their audience using basic demographic variables 
like age, gender, or location.22 They can also select more granular categories—
 
 18. See Hanna Kozlowska, “Why Am I Seeing This Ad” Explanations on Facebook are 
Incomplete and Misleading, a Study Says, QUARTZ (Apr. 6, 2018), https://qz.com/1245941/why-
am-i-seeing-this-ad-explanations-on-facebook-are-incomplete-and-misleading-a-study-says/ 
[https://perma.cc/6TGR-EGTQ]; Dylan Curran, Are You Ready? Here Is All the Data Facebook 
and Google Have on You, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2018, 3:17 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/all-the-data-facebook-google-has-on-
you-privacy [https://perma.cc/FFT2-HJMT]. 
 19. See Julia Angwin, Surya Mattu & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Doesn’t Tell Users 
Everything It Really Knows About Them, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 27, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.pro 
publica.org/article/facebook-doesnt-tell-users-everything-it-really-knows-about-them [https://per 
ma.cc/6WE7-BR2M]. 
 20. Angwin et al., supra note 19 (collecting more than 52,000 unique attributes that Facebook 
uses to classify users); Till Speicher et al., Potential for Discrimination in Online Targeted 
Advertising, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 7 (2018), http://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/ 
speicher18a/speicher18a.pdf [https://perma.cc/LDW5-57UA] (reporting retrieval of nearly 
240,000 free-form attributes available on Facebook). 
 21. See Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 7; Targeting Tips to Reach the Right People, 
FACEBOOK BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/a/facebook-ads-targeting-tips 
[https://perma.cc/8XGE-BK5Z] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018); Choose Your Audience, FACEBOOK 
BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/products/ads/ad-targeting [https://perma.cc/VM 
K5- 3G58] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
 22. See Targeting Tips to Reach the Right People, supra note 21. 
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for example, targeting an audience that is politically conservative or excluding 
from their audience people labeled as interested in red wine or the Civil War.23 
There are at least three ways in which targeted online recruitment may have 
discriminatory effects, whether intended or not. First, employers might rely on 
a protected characteristic to include or exclude recipients from their targeted 
group. For example, they might limit their audience to only women, or to 
individuals between the ages of eighteen and forty.24 Second, employers might 
choose their target audience by relying on attributes that appear to be neutral yet 
are closely correlated with protected characteristics.25 For example, in areas with 
heavy residential segregation, limiting advertisements to people in certain zip 
codes can create a racially skewed applicant pool. Similarly, directing ads at 
users labeled with the attributes “Young & Hip” or “Millennial” will likely avoid 
older workers, and excluding users interested in “Nuestro Diario” will eliminate 
many Hispanics from the target audience.26  
The third way online advertising can have discriminatory effects is through 
Facebook’s “lookalike” audience tool.27 To use this feature, advertisers provide 
Facebook with information about an existing group—the source audience—that 
it knows to be a relevant audience. In the recruiting context, the source audience 
might be an employer’s current workforce. Facebook then uses traits such as 
location, age, gender, and interests to find other Facebook users who are similar 
to the source audience.28 If a company’s workforce is already biased along the 
lines of age, race, or sex, creating a “lookalike” audience that matches its current 
employees’ characteristics will simply perpetuate those biases and exclude 
people that belong to different demographic groups. 
The first method—defining the target audience using a protected 
characteristic—generally involves an intentional choice on the part of the 
employer, and Facebook’s platform makes that kind of choice possible. 
ProPublica reported in 2016 that it was able to purchase housing ads on 
Facebook that excluded users with the attributes of African-American, Asian-
 
 23. See Noam Scheiber, Facebook’s Ad-Targeting Problem, Captured in a Literal Shade of 
Gray, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/technology/facebook-
ads.html [https://perma.cc/W5LH-EGYR?type=image]. 
 24. See Angwin et al., supra note 1. 
 25. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 10. 
 26. See Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 9; Verne Kopytoff, Tech Industry Job Ads: Older 
Workers Need Not Apply, FORTUNE (June 19, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/06/19/tech-job-ads-
discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/XW72-B5WF]. Though these groups do not specifically limit 
which ages are included, users who are sorted into them are people who have been labeled as such 
or like pages related to the labels; typically, this would attract younger audiences and 
disproportionately exclude people over a certain age. 
 27. About Lookalike Audiences, FACEBOOK BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/ 
help/164749007013531 [https://perma.cc/S935-22UW] (last visited Nov. 7, 2018). 
 28. Targeting Tips to Reach the Right People, supra note 21. 
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American, or Hispanic affinity.29 Facebook subsequently announced that it 
would no longer accept ads for housing, employment, or credit that relied on 
ethnic attributes, but a follow-up study showed that targeting such ads on these 
bases was still possible.30 Facebook has apparently not attempted to prohibit the 
use of sex or age categories for targeted ads.31 In the Bradley case, the plaintiffs 
were able to document numerous examples of job ads that targeted a restricted 
age range, such as T-Mobile’s ad aimed at people eighteen to thirty-eight.32  
The second and third methods could also be used deliberately by an 
advertiser to restrict its audience on the basis of race, sex, or other protected 
category. In order to investigate this possibility, Speicher et al. tested whether a 
“malicious advertiser” could exclude certain groups by leveraging the extensive 
personal data available through Facebook.33 They found, as suggested above, 
that many of the attributes collected by Facebook are strongly correlated with 
protected traits like race and could be used deliberately to “allow extremely 
biased targeting.”34 Speicher et al. also demonstrated that if an advertiser started 
with a highly biased source audience, it could use Facebook’s lookalike audience 
feature to “effectively scal[e] the bias to much larger populations.”35  
As Speicher et al. acknowledge, however, discriminatory bias in ad delivery 
might occur unintentionally as well.36 When an advertiser relies on neutral 
attributes to select an audience, it may not always be obvious that doing so can 
skew the audience along demographic lines. Particularly, when multiple 
attributes are combined to define who to target, the interaction between those 
attributes may make it difficult to predict the effects that they will have on the 
composition of the audience. Similarly, because Facebook’s algorithm 
determines what are the salient features of the source audience that will be used 
to select the lookalike audience, an employer relying on this tool may not realize 
its potential to target audiences which are biased in some way. 
Other experimental studies have documented instances of biased delivery of 
employment ads, as well as the difficulty in determining the causes of the bias. 
Datta et al. ran an experiment in which simulated computer users were identified 
as male or female and engaged in identical web browsing activities to signal 
 
 29. See Angwin & Parris, Jr., supra note 8. 
 30. See Angwin, supra note 8. 
 31. See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 7 (Facebook vice president defended use of age as 
valid basis for advertising). 
 32. Bradley v. T-Mobile, No. 5:17-cv-07232, 2017 WL 6539268, para. 2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 
2018). 
 33. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 7–10. 
 34. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 11. 
 35. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 11. Speicher et al. also analyzed a third mechanism for 
targeting users—the custom audience. Id. at 4–7. We omit discussion of this targeting method 
because it is not as relevant to our analysis. 
 36. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 2. 
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their interest in employment.37 The experimenters found that Google served 
different ads relating to employment opportunities to male and female users. For 
example, an ad for a career coaching service for high-paying executive positions 
was shown far more often to male users.38 Although the difference in ad delivery 
was significant, the authors reported that they could not “determine whether 
Google, the advertiser, or complex interactions among them and others caused 
the discrimination.”39 They also acknowledged the possibility that the 
discriminatory effects might be entirely unintentional—resulting, for example, 
from the operation of algorithms that optimize clicks or other metrics.40 
Regardless of whether the discriminatory effects were inadvertent, they argued 
that their findings raise concerns because of their unjust social effects.41 
In another study, Lambrecht and Tucker ran a field test of an ad promoting 
STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) careers.42 Although the 
ad was intended to be shown on a gender-neutral basis, they found that twenty 
percent more men than women received it.43 This difference was observed even 
though women were more likely to click on the ad if they received it.44 
Lambrecht and Tucker suggest that the gender disparity in delivery of the ad 
resulted from spillover effects in the ad ecosystem. More specifically, because 
younger women are a prized demographic for other advertisers, it is costlier to 
serve ads to them.45 As a result, algorithms that optimize cost efficiency may 
produce a discriminatory pattern of ad delivery that effectively reduces women’s 
access to information about career opportunities.  
These studies show that online targeting can result in unequal ad delivery. 
Determining the causes of the disparities can be difficult, however. Even when 
conducting a controlled study, researchers cannot always pinpoint the precise 
reasons why biased outcomes are observed.46 Regardless of the cause, these 
methods of targeting ads can end up sorting people such that certain groups are 
systematically denied information about available jobs. When this works to 
 
 37. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz & Anupam Datta, Automated Experiments on Ad 
Privacy Settings, 1 PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS. 92, 93 (2015). 
 38. Id. at 93, 102. 
 39. Id. at 105. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, Algorithmic Bias? An Empirical Study into Apparent 
Gender-Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads (Mar. 9, 2018), https://papers.ss 
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852260 [https://perma.cc/598J-S2F2]. 
 43. Id. at 2. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 24–25. 
 46. Without a field experiment or controlled study, it may be difficult to detect biased patterns 
in ad delivery. For this reason, auditing the operation of algorithms like online ad delivery systems 
is crucial for detecting discrimination. See Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 
166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189 (2017). 
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exacerbate inequality or disadvantage along the lines of race, sex, or other 
protected characteristics, the results are a form of data-driven discrimination 
described in earlier work as “classification bias.”47 Because classification bias 
risks deepening existing patterns of inequality, it should be a matter of 
significant policy concern. The next part considers the extent to which existing 
legal tools can reach this form of bias. 
III.  DISCRIMINATORY EMPLOYMENT ADS: A LOOK BACK 
Before the mid-1960s, employment ads that specified race and gender 
requirements for employees were commonplace.48 Postings typically specified 
if a man or woman was wanted for the job, and ads that sought applications only 
from whites, or from particular ethnic groups, were common. Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 changed all that. In addition to Title VII’s familiar 
prohibition on firing or refusing to hire workers because of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin, the statute includes a provision in Section 704(b) that 
makes it unlawful for employers to publish advertisements expressing a 
preference based on one of the protected categories.49 When Congress passed 
the ADEA in 1967, it included nearly identical language forbidding employers 
from indicating age-based preferences in their job postings.50 
After Title VII became effective, job advertisements expressing racial 
preferences quickly disappeared, but the application of Section 704(b) to sex-
specific ads was contested.51 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) initially published guidance that allowed sex-segregated help-wanted 
columns so long as the text of the ad itself stated that the position was open to 
males and females.52 As newspapers continued to publish sex-segregated job ads 
under the EEOC’s sanction, women’s advocacy groups protested and rallied for 
stricter regulations. The National Organization for Women, which formed in 
1966 partly in response to the EEOC’s failure to prohibit sex-segregated ads, put 
 
 47. Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 890–
92 (2017). 
 48. Nicholas Pedriana & Amanda Abraham, Now You See Them, Now You Don’t: The Legal 
Field and Newspaper Desegregation of Sex-Segregated Help Wanted Ads 1965–75, 31 LAW & 
SOCIAL INQUIRY 905, 906 (2006). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012). 
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012). 
 51. See Pedriana & Abraham, supra note 48, at 911. 
 52. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 30 Fed. Reg. 14926–28 (Dec. 2, 1965) 
(originally codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1604). The EEOC required that sex-segregated ads (1) 
“specifically state that the job is open to males and females” and (2) include in that section of the 
newspaper a boxed nondiscrimination disclaimer. The disclaimer had to make clear that separate 
sex male and female listings “specifically state that the job is open to males and females,” and were 
“not intended to exclude or discourage applications for persons of the other sex.”; Pedriana & 
Abraham, supra note 48, at 913 (quoting EEOC Press Release from September 22, 1965). 
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increased pressure on the EEOC to change its stance.53 In 1968 the EEOC 
revised its guidelines to unequivocally declare that “the placement of job 
advertisements under separate male and female column headings violates the 
law.”54  
Around the same time, states and local governments passed their own 
employment discrimination statutes that created liability for employers who 
advertised in sex-segregated columns.55 Many of these state and local laws also 
included “aiding and abetting” provisions holding non-employer entities liable 
for participating in discrimination by an employer.56 Women’s advocacy groups 
successfully used these laws to argue that newspapers which published sex-
segregated help-wanted ads were unlawfully “aiding and abetting” gender 
discrimination.57  
In 1973, the Supreme Court upheld the application of an “aiding and 
abetting” clause to a newspaper that published separate male and female 
employment columns,58 and shortly thereafter, major newspapers throughout the 
country abandoned the practice.59 Employers also stopped stating discriminatory 
preferences explicitly in their job ads, and as a result, the provisions forbidding 
discriminatory ads were largely forgotten in the following decades. Instead, 
litigants overwhelmingly focused on challenging adverse employment actions 
such as failure to hire or discharge under the disparate treatment and disparate 
impact theories of liability.60 
The growth in targeted online ads—and the risks of bias discussed in Part II 
above—raises questions of whether and when employers will be liable for the 
discriminatory effects of their recruitment practices. In this section, we discuss 
how past cases treated employers’ offline recruitment practices under the 
discriminatory advertising provisions, as well as under the more familiar 
 
 53. Pedriana & Abraham, supra note 48, at 913–14. 
 54. Id. at 914 (quoting Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Issues 
Guidelines on Classified Advert., Rules Separate Male-Female Ads Illegal, (Aug. 6, 1968) (on file 
with the EEOC Library)). The American Newspaper Publishing Association filed suit arguing that 
EEOC guidelines were not legally binding, but federal courts rejected the argument and held that 
EEOC interpretations should be accorded consideration. See Am. Newspaper Pub. Ass’n v. 
Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C 1968). See also Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 
228 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 55. Pedriana & Abraham, supra note 48, at 916. 
 56. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5–12 (West 2018); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 
2017); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a–60 (West 2017). 
 57. See, e.g., Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 308 A.2d 649 (N.J. 1973); Nat’l Org. for Women 
v. State Div. of Human Rights, 314 N.E.2d 867 (N.Y. 1974); State Div. of Human Rights ex rel 
Carey v. Binghamton Press Co., 67 A.D.2d 231 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). 
 58. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 
(1973). 
 59. Pedriana & Abraham, supra note 48, at 906. 
 60. See, e.g., Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1983). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] DISCRIMINATION IN ONLINE EMPLOYMENT RECRUITING 103 
theories of disparate treatment and disparate impact liability. Section A reviews 
the law addressing when employers are liable for their discriminatory 
advertising. Section B explores cases where employers’ advertising and other 
recruiting practices provide evidence to support plaintiffs’ disparate treatment 
and disparate impact claims. 
A. Liability for Discriminatory Advertising 
Section 704(b) of Title VII states:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to print or 
publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating 
to employment . . . indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or 
discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .61 
The statute makes an exception if the position is one for which religion, sex, or 
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification,62 but otherwise the 
prohibition seems quite absolute. Section 623(e) of the ADEA contains nearly 
identical language prohibiting advertisements expressing age preferences.63 
Liability under these provisions turns on whether an advertisement “indicat[es] 
any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination” on a forbidden 
basis.64 These prohibitions clearly forbid a job posting stating that the employer 
will only hire workers of a particular race, gender or age, for example, but it is 
less certain how they apply when the preferences are not expressed explicitly.  
The EEOC has offered only minimal guidance in this area. As mentioned 
above, in 1968 it issued guidance stating that it considered the placement of help 
wanted ads in sex segregated columns to be “an expression of a preference, 
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on sex.”65 Thus, even if the 
content of an ad was gender neutral, it violated the statute when placed in a 
column indicating a preference for hiring males or females. Although the 
EEOC’s guidance only addresses sex-segregated job listings, it suggests more 
 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012). This prohibition also applies to labor organizations, 
employment agencies, or committees that control access to apprenticeships or training programs. 
 62. Employer notices or advertisements “may indicate a preference, limitation, specification, 
or discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex, or national origin is 
a bona fide occupational qualification for employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012). 
 63. The ADEA language states that: 
It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment agency to print or 
publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to 
employment by such an employer or membership in or any classification or referral for 
employment by such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for 
employment by such an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, 
specification, or discrimination, based on age. 
29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012). 
 64. 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012). 
 65. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5 (1968). 
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broadly that the context in which an ad appears can provide evidence of a 
discriminatory preference even if the text alone does not. 
Regarding the analogous provisions in the ADEA, the Department of Labor, 
which was initially responsible for the statute’s enforcement, issued an 
Interpretive Bulletin declaring that when advertisements “contain terms and 
phrases such as ‘age 25 to 35,’ ‘young,’ ‘boy,’ ‘girl,’ or others of a similar nature 
which indicate a preference for a particular age, range of ages, or for a young 
age group, such a term or phrase . . . is in violation of the Act . . . .”66 The 
position of the Department appeared to be that using these terms, even absent an 
express intent to discriminate against older workers, was inherently 
discriminatory. The EEOC assumed responsibility for enforcing the ADEA in 
1979,67 and it has adopted the same position as its own guidance, reasoning that 
the use of such terms “tend[s] to limit or deter the employment of older 
workers.”68  
Only a small handful of cases have interpreted the discriminatory 
advertising provisions of Title VII and the ADEA, and courts have found that 
liability turns on two distinct issues. The first considers when an advertisement 
indicates a discriminatory preference. The second concerns who can bring suit 
against an employer or other covered entity that publishes such an 
advertisement.  
Determining when an advertisement is unlawful requires examining not just 
the use of specific words within the four corners of the ad, but also the overall 
context in which it is published. In one of the earliest published cases, Hailes v. 
United Air Lines, the defendant advertised for stewardesses in the “Help 
Wanted-Female” column but did not place a similar ad in the “Help Wanted-
Male” column.69 The plaintiff, a male applicant, saw the ad and sued, alleging 
discriminatory advertising.70 The Fifth Circuit concluded that he had stated a 
claim for relief under 704(b), given the language and the context of the ad.71 
Consistent with the EEOC’s guidance, the court found that placing the ad in the 
“Help Wanted—Female” column “plainly indicates a preference for females” 
 
 66. 29 C.F.R. § 860.92(b) (1968) (effectively rescinded by 46 Fed. Reg. 47724 (Sept 29, 
1981), and transferred from the C.F.R. by 52 Fed. Reg. 23812 (June 25, 1987)). This interpretation 
was created when the Department of Labor was responsible for enforcing the ADEA. When the 
responsibility shifted to the EEOC, the EEOC passed an almost parallel regulation codified as 29 
C.F.R. § 1625. 
 67. Victoria A. Lipnic, The State of Age Discrimination and Older Workers in the U.S. 50 
Years After the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N (June 2018), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/adea50th/report.cfm [https://perma.cc/2 
V6D-4WKJ]. 
 68. 29 C.F.R. § 1625 (2007). 
 69. Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1009. 
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and that the inclusion of a statement by the airline that it was an “Equal 
Opportunity Employer” could not overcome that conclusion.72  
A case decided under Section 623(e) of the ADEA also focused on context 
to determine whether advertisements indicated a preference based on age. In 
Hodgson v. Approved Personnel Service, Inc., an employment agency published 
over fifty advertisements with phrases such as: “recent college graduate,” 
“excellent first job,” “1–2 years out of college,” “recent high school grad,” 
“young executive,” “junior accountant,” “athletically inclined,” “career girls,” 
and “young office group.”73 The Department of Labor filed suit, arguing that the 
use of these types of “trigger words” is a per se violation of Section 623(e).74 
The Fourth Circuit instead found that “that the discriminatory effect of an 
advertisement is determined not by ‘trigger words’ but rather by its context.”75 
Advertisements did not need to explicitly state “younger workers only” or 
restrict applicants to a certain age range to violate Section 623(e). On the other 
hand, not every use of a trigger word established a discriminatory preference. 
For example, the court found that the term “junior executive” simply described 
the seniority level of the advertised position, rather than carrying connotations 
of youth.76 In contrast, using the terms “girls” or “career girls” was 
discriminatory because it conveyed that the company was not interested in older 
applicants.77 
In other cases, the expression of a discriminatory preference was quite 
obvious from the text of the ads. For example, one company published an ad 
seeking an accountant with the description: “[y]oung man with a college 
degree.”78 The court found it “hardly open to debate that the defendant violated 
the unambiguous provisions of [Section 704(b)] by advertising for a male 
accountant.”79 In another case, companies recruiting on a college campus 
checked a box indicating that they preferred to interview only male graduates, 
and the court had no difficulty concluding those employers had “indicated an 
express preference” to hire males.80 The courts in these cases easily found that 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. 529 F.2d 760, 763, 765–66, 768 (4th Cir. 1975). 
 74. Id. at 765. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 767, n.14. 
 78. Banks v. Heun-Norwood, 566 F.2d 1073, 1074 (8th Cir. 1977). Although the court thought 
that the employer had clearly violated 704(b), it refused to find liability on the grounds that plaintiff 
was not “aggrieved,” an issue discussed further below. 
 79. Id. at 1076. 
 80. McDonald v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24, 37 (E.D. Cal. 1974). The opinion does not 
make clear which section of Title VII the plaintiff had alleged was violated, but the court’s analysis 
of the job postings most easily fits with an allegation of liability under Section 704(b). 
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the employers had expressed discriminatory preferences, but the availability of 
relief turned on a second issue—whether the plaintiff could bring suit.81 
In addition to showing that an ad violates 704(b), plaintiffs must show that 
they are “aggrieved” persons authorized to bring suit.82 In Hailes, the court 
easily found that posting a job for “stewardesses” in a “Help Wanted—Female” 
column violated 704(b), but it also considered whether the male plaintiff could 
sue.83 The defendant, United Air Lines, argued that because Hailes never applied 
for a position, he was not aggrieved.84 The court rejected that argument, but also 
declined to permit suit by “a mere casual reader.”85 Instead, it held that a plaintiff 
challenging a discriminatory ad must have “a real, present interest in the type of 
employment advertised” and must show that the ad “effectively deterred” the 
plaintiff from applying.86 Other courts have followed this reasoning by the 
Hailes court.87 
Requiring that private plaintiffs have a “real, present interest” in the 
employment properly ensures that they have a genuine stake in the litigation. 
They should be able to show that they are actively looking for work and would 
plausibly have been interested in an advertised position. However, insisting that 
they also prove that an ad “effectively deterred” them from applying is not 
justified by either the text or the purpose of the statute. Sections 704(b) and 
623(e) flatly forbid advertisements that “indicat[e] any preference, limitation, 
specification, or discrimination” on a prohibited basis, with no additional 
requirement of proving that the advertisement had any specific adverse effects.88 
These provisions differ in this respect from the general anti-discrimination 
prohibitions found in Sections 703(a) and 623(a), which require some kind of 
adverse employment action or effect on complainants’ job opportunities to 
establish an unlawful employment practice.89 Thus, as a textual matter, 704(b) 
 
 81. Banks, 566 F.2d at 1076; McDonald, 387 F. Supp. 24 at 34. 
 82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2012) (describing when and how an aggrieved person can 
make a claim). 
 83. Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1008–09 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 84. Id. at 1008. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. In the Hailes case, the “effectively deterred” requirement posed no difficulty because 
the plaintiff was able to demonstrate that he reasonably believed that applying to be a flight 
attendant would be futile. By allowing Hailes to sue even though he had not applied, the court acted 
consistently with cases holding that plaintiffs can pursue discriminatory failure-to-hire claims 
without having actually applied when doing so would be a “futile gesture.” There is, however, a 
difference between permitting a plaintiff to sue without having applied in a failure-to-hire case, and 
requiring a plaintiff to prove that an advertisement has deterred her application in order to bring a 
704(b) claim. For reasons explained in text, the latter requirement is unwarranted. 
 87. See, e.g., Banks v. Heun-Norwood, 566 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1977); McDonald v. 
General Mills, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24 (1974). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012). 
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and 623(e) liability should turn solely on the nature of the employer’s 
advertisements, not plaintiffs’ reactions to them. 
Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that they were deterred from applying 
may also undermine the purposes of those provisions, which is to forbid 
employers from publicly expressing their discriminatory preferences.90 If a job 
seeker persists and applies for a job despite clearly discriminatory language, the 
employer should not escape liability on the grounds that it did not successfully 
deter the plaintiff’s application. The plaintiff should still be considered an 
aggrieved party because the employer has expressly signaled that it devalues, if 
not outright rejects, applicants like her for reasons that are unlawful. If the 
employer rejects her application, she may also have a claim for discriminatory 
failure to hire, but the 704(b) or 623(e) violation should be recognized as an 
independent basis for liability. 
B. Advertising and Recruiting Practices as Evidence of Discrimination 
Although only a handful of cases have analyzed the discriminatory 
advertising provisions, courts also sometimes look at an employer’s advertising 
and recruiting practices as evidence of discrimination under the general 
prohibitions against employment discrimination found in Title VII and the 
ADEA.91 These provisions forbid adverse employment actions such as failure 
 
 90. Banks, 566 F.2d at 1074–79, illustrates how such a requirement can undermine 
enforcement of 704(b). In that case, the employer escaped liability for publishing an advertisement 
seeking a “young man” as an accountant, a clear statutory violation, because the court found that 
the plaintiff had not been deterred by the ad. She had called to inquire about the position despite its 
discriminatory language, and persisted even after the company confirmed that it was seeking a man. 
It was only after the company made it clear that she would not be paid the salary she was seeking 
that she gave up applying. Ironically, if the plaintiff had been less determined and had not inquired 
about the job at all, she would have been considered “aggrieved” and could have pursued her 704(b) 
claim. 
The court appears to have conflated the plaintiff’s 704(b) claim with a claim of intentional 
discrimination. It cited McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the case that laid out the framework for 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, even though that framework has no relevance in 
a 704(b) case. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As Judge Bright 
explained, “In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court provided guidelines for establishing 
discriminatory conduct where the employer’s conduct is so subtle that the plaintiff cannot prove 
discrimination directly. In the present case, the employer’s conduct is neither subtle nor indirect. 
The employer here openly announced its interest in employing only males for the advertised 
position.” Banks, 566 F.2d at 1079 (Bright, J. Statement on denial of petition for Rehearing En 
Banc). 
 91. Title VII states that: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
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to hire, or discharge, that are taken because of a protected characteristic, as well 
as other practices that have the effect of depriving individuals of employment 
opportunities on those bases.92 
Courts have generally recognized two routes for proving unlawful 
discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact.93 Disparate treatment 
applies when an employer intended to discriminate on the basis of a protected 
characteristic.94 Disparate impact, on the other hand, does not require intent—
only that the employment policy or practice disproportionately affects a 
protected group.95 Distinct from the possibility of violating the discriminatory 
preference provisions, an employer’s advertising and recruiting practices can 
provide evidence supporting either a disparate treatment or disparate impact 
theory of liability. 
When plaintiffs allege disparate treatment, an employer’s advertisements 
expressing a preference based on a protected characteristic may serve as relevant 
evidence, strengthening the inference that it had a discriminatory motive when 
it refused to hire or fired members of that group. For example, in Capaci v. Katz 
& Besthoff, Inc., the EEOC alleged that a company failed to hire and promote 
females at the same rate as males.96 To support its claim of disparate treatment, 
the EEOC argued that the company’s past advertising “indicated a preference 
 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). The ADEA contains nearly identical language: 
It shall be unlawful for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s age . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). This provision is also known as § 703(a). Title VII has 
traditionally been interpreted as forbidding disparate treatment under § 703(a)(1). Kim, supra note 
47, at 910–12. Disparate impact theory was originally recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424 (1971), and has since been codified in § 704(k). In Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 
228 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the disparate impact theory also applied in age 
discrimination cases. 
 93. See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 569 (1978); Charles A. Sullivan, 
Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 914 
(2005) (“Early in its history, the Supreme Court adopted two definitions of the term [discriminate]: 
. . . . disparate impact . . . [and] disparate treatment . . . .”). 
 94. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 
U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988). 
 95. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018). 
 96. 711 F.2d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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for males in management openings and a preference for females in non-
management positions.”97 The ads sought applications from “qualified young 
men” for its management training positions, while seeking “counter girls” and 
“salesladies” for non-management jobs.98 In addition, the latter advertisements 
were all placed in “Help Wanted-Female” newspaper columns, while ads for “a 
manager trainee, ‘career in management,’ fountain manager trainee and 
personnel director were found in the male columns.”99 These ads undoubtedly 
violated Section 704(b), but rather than pursue liability under that section,100 the 
EEOC argued that they provided evidence of the employer’s discriminatory 
intent in hiring.101 The Fifth Circuit agreed, finding the advertising evidence to 
be “useful and probative” in establishing the employers’ “motivation and hiring 
policies” and concluding that it showed an intent to discriminate based on sex.102 
Plaintiffs in ADEA cases have also attempted to use an employer’s allegedly 
discriminatory ads as evidence of age discrimination. In Hodgson v. First 
Federal, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) sought an injunction prohibiting an 
employer from engaging in age discrimination in the future.103 As part of its 
evidence of discriminatory hiring, the DOL pointed to an advertisement the 
defendant had placed in the newspaper seeking a “young man” for the position 
of financial advertising assistant.104 The court found that it was “substantive 
evidence of a policy of age discrimination” which, combined with other 
evidence in the case, justified the broad injunction sought by the DOL.105 
Similarly, in Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the court relied on an 
employer’s job advertisement to find age discrimination.106 The complainant, 
who was fifty-seven, had been fired and the company placed an ad seeking 
applicants between the ages of nineteen and twenty-six for the position shortly 
 
 97. Id. at 658–659. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 659. 
 100. It appears that by the time of the litigation, the company had ceased its discriminatory 
advertising practices and so there was no need for the EEOC to pursue injunctive relief to prevent 
further violations. 
 101. Capaci, 711 F.2d at 658. 
 102. Id. at 660, 666. 
 103. Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 455 F.2d 818, 820–21 (5th Cir. 1972). 
 104. Hodgson, 455 F.2d at 825–26. 
 105. Id. at 826–27. The district court originally issued an injunction prohibiting age 
discrimination in hiring bank tellers. Id. at 821. After reviewing advertisements that indicated age 
discrimination across a variety of positions, the Fifth Circuit held that the injunction needed to be 
broadened to include all jobs. Id. at 826–27. See also DeBuhr v. Olds Prod. Co., No. 95 C 1462, 
1996 WL 277644 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 1996) (finding that though the “advertisement does not alone 
directly support a claim for intentional discrimination, viewing [it] in light of the other statements 
made by [the president] it adds to the circumstantial evidence from which discriminatory intent 
might be inferred.”). 
 106. 554 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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afterward.107 The court inferred from this evidence that the decision to discharge 
complainant “was tainted by the impermissible criterion of age.”108  
Arguments that an employer’s advertising practices are proof of intentional 
discrimination are not always successful. Rather, their impact depends upon the 
language and context of the ads, as well as other circumstances surrounding the 
allegedly discriminatory actions. For example, merely using the pronoun “his” 
in a job advertisement does not create an inference of sex discrimination.109 
Similarly, encouraging applications from degree candidates does not necessarily 
mean an employer is engaged in age discrimination.110 In another case, the court 
found that the use of phrases such as “young bankers,” “fresh new ideas and 
outlook,” and “new talent” in connection with a college recruiting program did 
not provide proof that “age discrimination was the standard operating 
procedure” in the employer’s dealings with existing employees of the companies 
it had acquired.111 Thus, depending upon the circumstances, an employer’s 
advertising can support an inference that an employer has acted for 
discriminatory reasons. 
Courts have also found that employers’ recruitment practices can give rise 
to disparate impact liability.112 In a case from the Sixth Circuit, United States v. 
City of Warren, the Department of Justice filed suit against a municipality that 
did not have a single black employee out of a workforce of 1,500.113 The City 
of Warren was located in Macomb County, which was overwhelmingly white, 
and immediately adjacent to Detroit, which had a majority black population.114 
Warren advertised its municipal employment opportunities in three newspapers 
with circulations in the County and in none of the newspapers with significant 
circulation in Detroit.115 There was no allegation that the ads themselves 
expressed a discriminatory preference in violation of Section 704(b). However, 
the employer’s recruiting practices as a whole were challenged as racially 
discriminatory.116 The Sixth Circuit agreed, finding that by publishing job 
notices only in outlets where black applicants were extremely unlikely to see 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 735. 
 109. Wallette v. Thompson, 373 F. Supp.2d 986, 992 (D.N.D. 2005). 
 110. Boyd v. City of Wilmington, 943 F. Supp. 585, 591 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (finding that word 
“candidates” is not listed in the EEOC regulation as one of the “trigger words,” does not carry 
“connotations of youth” as discussed in Hodgson, and does not indicate a preference for young 
applicants because it is merely part of the description of educational qualifications needed for the 
position). 
 111. Stone v. First Union Corp., 203 F.R.D. 532, 549 (S.D. Fla. 2001). 
 112. United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083 (6th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 
65 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 113. City of Warren, 138 F.3d at 1094. 
 114. Id. at 1088. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
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them, the City had created an effective barrier to black employment.117 The court 
concluded that Warren’s “limitation of its applicant pool to residents of the 
overwhelmingly white city, combined with its refusal to publicize jobs outside 
the racially homogeneous county,” had a disparate impact on black workers in 
violation of Title VII.118 
Word-of-mouth and other informal recruiting practices may also give rise to 
liability for disparate impact discrimination.119 For example, in Thomas v. 
Washington County School Board, a black teacher sued alleging race 
discrimination in hiring when it failed to notify her of job openings after she had 
expressed interest in a teaching position.120 The Board generally did not 
advertise teaching vacancies, but posted notices of available openings in its 
school buildings.121 Applicants therefore learned of opportunities primarily 
through word-of-mouth and were often relatives of current school employees. 
Because the plaintiff had not been aware of new job openings, she had been 
unable to apply.122 The plaintiff also produced evidence of at least forty-six 
cases of nepotism and the testimony of other black applicants who had been 
unable to apply because they were unaware of job openings.123 The court found 
that “nepotism and word-of-mouth hiring . . . in the context of a predominantly 
white work force, serve[s] to freeze the effects of past discrimination.”124 
Although the court did not find evidence of intentional discrimination, it 
permitted the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim because the board’s recruiting 
 
 117. Id. at 1094. 
 118. City of Warren, 138 F.3d at 1094. At trial, the United States offered evidence comparing 
Warren’s applicant pools for police and firefighter positions before and after its advertising 
practices changed. Id. at 1092–93. When the city limited its advertisements to Warren and Macomb 
County in 1985 and 1986, zero of the 182 applications for firefighter positions, and one of the 400 
applications for police officers were from black applicants. Id. at 1089. When the city advertised in 
Detroit newspapers in 1987, it “attracted 50 black applicants (6.2% of the total).” United States v. 
City of Warren, No. 86-CV-75435-DT, 1992 WL 509994, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 12, 1992), rev’d 
in part, 138 F.3d 1083 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 119. See, e.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 271 (10th Cir. 1975) (utilizing an 
employee referral system for hiring is an unlawful employment practice under Title VII where (1) 
an employer relies primarily or exclusively on such a method and (2) because of a history of past 
discrimination, the almost all white work force tends to perpetuate itself); E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone 
Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002) (company had a practice of only hiring male 
waiters and it relied on an employee referral system that reinforced this discrimination); United 
States v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., CIV. A. No. H–83–5107, 1987 WL 9919, at *27 (S.D. Tex. 
Apr. 18, 1987) (word-of-mouth recruitment and refusal to attend the historically black college’s 
career fair was evidence of intentional discrimination); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 
547 (4th Cir. 1975); Parham v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970). 
 120. Thomas v. Washington Cty. Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 923–24 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 121. Id. at 924–25. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 925. 
 124. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
112 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:93 
practices “may discriminate against minorities as effectively as an intentionally 
discriminatory policy.”125 
***** 
In the offline world before social media and targeted advertising, 
discriminatory recruitment practices could give rise to employer liability under 
the advertising provisions of Title VII and the ADEA, or under those statutes’ 
more general provisions prohibiting unlawful adverse actions such as failure to 
hire or discharge. Liability under the discriminatory advertising provisions 
turned on proof that an advertisement or job posting expressed an unlawful 
preference—a determination made by looking not only at the words used in an 
ad, but also its entire context. Employers were also sometimes held liable for 
unlawful failure to hire or discharge when their recruiting practices either served 
as evidence of discriminatory intent, or were neutral in content, but had the effect 
of discriminating against protected workers. 
IV.  ASSESSING LIABILITY FOR ONLINE TARGETED RECRUITMENT 
While the old help-wanted ads in newspapers could potentially have been 
seen by anyone, platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are desirable fora for 
employers to advertise precisely because they can target specific audiences.126 
Employers do not need to pay for ads served to a mass audience, but only to the 
most relevant and desirable groups of users.127 This “microtargeting” winnows 
audiences down by excluding those outside the targeted group from seeing the 
ads at all. As discussed in Part II, sometimes that microtargeting can have the 
effect of excluding already disadvantaged groups along the lines of race, sex, 
age and other protected characteristics—an effect we referred to as classification 
bias.128 In this Part we consider the extent to which existing anti-discrimination 
law can reach such recruiting practices. We first evaluate whether the provisions 
in Title VII and the ADEA forbidding discriminatory advertising might apply. 
We next consider whether these practices might give rise to liability under 
traditional disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. 
 
 125. Thomas, 915 F.2d at 925–26. 
 126. Angwin et al., supra note 1 (stating that “[t]he ability of advertisers to deliver their 
message to the precise audience most likely to respond is the cornerstone of Facebook’s business 
model.”). 
 127. See Angwin et al., supra note 1. The article details that it is “[t]he precision of Facebook’s 
ad delivery [that] has helped it dominate an industry once in the hands of print and broadcast outlets. 
The system, called microtargeting, allows advertisers to reach essentially whomever they prefer, 
including the people their analysis suggests are the most plausible hires or consumers, lowering the 
costs and vastly increasing efficiency.” 
 128. See infra Part II. 
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A. Expressing Discriminatory Preferences Through Targeted Advertising 
Recall that there are three distinct ways in which employers’ online 
recruitment practices might cause discriminatory effects. The first method 
involves using protected characteristics like sex or age to define the target 
audience. As discussed above, whether a notice expresses a discriminatory 
preference depends not just on its text or the use of certain words, but the overall 
context in which it appears. The recruitment ads that appear in someone’s 
newsfeed are unlikely to include text or images that directly express a preference 
based on race, sex or age, but the context in which an ad is distributed may do 
so instead. For example, in the Bradley case, the plaintiffs collected numerous 
examples of job postings on Facebook in which the contents of the ads were 
neutral, and yet, the ads were deliberately targeted in a way that excluded older 
workers.129 This age-based targeting was not visible from the ad itself. However, 
in the examples appended to the Bradley complaint, users who clicked on the 
“Why Am I Seeing This?” link130 learned that the ad was targeted to persons in 
a particular age range, such as eighteen to thirty-five.131  
A strong argument can be made that ads like these—which expressly rely 
on age to target a younger audience—are “indicating” a “limitation” or 
“specification” based on age in violation of Section 623(e). Similarly, if an 
employer sponsors career ads that are expressly targeted at only men or only 
women, it has indicated a preference that violates Section 704(b).132 Just like the 
sex-segregated newspaper columns in the 1970s, the criteria defining the target 
audience online should be part of the context relevant for determining the 
meaning of an advertisement today. And where an employer targets a group 
defined along the lines of race, sex, age, et cetera, it has clearly violated the 
prohibitions on discriminatory advertising. 
As discussed in Part II above, there are two additional ways that targeted 
advertising can have discriminatory effects: using neutral attributes that act as 
proxies for protected characteristics and relying on a biased source audience to 
build a “lookalike audience.”133 It will be more difficult to prove that an 
 
 129. Bradley v. T-Mobile, No. 5:17-cv-07232, 2017 WL 6539268, para. 2–3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
1, 2018). 
 130. The “Why am I seeing this?” feature was developed by Facebook in 2014 to address user 
concerns about how the platform targeted them based on their behaviors. The button is at the top 
of all advertisements. See Kozlowska, supra note 18; Todd Wasserman, Facebook Will Now Tell 
You Why You’re Seeing Those Ads, MASHABLE (June 12, 2014), https://mashable.com/2014/06/12/ 
facebook-explains-ads/#u2VFN4UBEmqC [https://perma.cc/YM6G-9HSG]. 
 131. Bradley, 2017 WL 6539268, para. 2–3. The explanations given by Facebook typically do 
not explain all of the bases on which users are targeted. Thus, the targeting process is not entirely 
transparent and it is possible that discriminatory bases are not always revealed. See Kozlowska, 
supra note 18. 
 132. Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 659 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 133. Speicher et al., supra note 20, at 11. 
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employer using either of these methods has violated the provisions prohibiting 
discriminatory advertising. There may be situations where a neutral attribute is 
so closely and obviously connected with a protected characteristic that relying 
on it may inherently express a discriminatory preference—for example, 
excluding users interested in BlackNews.com or Nuestro Diario.134 Similarly, if 
the employer provides a source audience that was itself defined in a 
discriminatory way—for example, its current employees under the age of 
forty—then using the lookalike audience tool might indicate an unlawful 
preference. In many other situations, however, the connection between the 
choice of attributes or a source audience and any discriminatory effects will be 
far more subtle, making it difficult to argue that the resulting advertising 
indicates a discriminatory preference. 
Assuming that an ad does express an unlawful preference, the second step 
in the analysis requires identifying who is entitled to bring a Section 704(b) or 
Section 623(e) claim. There may be a practical problem at the outset because the 
people most likely to be aggrieved are highly unlikely to learn about the 
discriminatory ads. Unlike sex-segregated columns which were plainly visible 
to anyone reading the newspaper, targeted advertising works by making ads 
visible only to the included group.135 Those who are not in the included group 
simply will not see the ad. They will have no opportunity to ask “Why Am I Not 
Seeing This Ad?” or to learn about the discriminatory targeting criteria.  
If users in the excluded group somehow become aware that they are not 
being shown ads, they can sue if they are “aggrieved” under the relevant statute. 
An individual who is actively seeking work and uses social media should be able 
to easily demonstrate a “real, present interest” in learning about job 
opportunities. As we have argued above, such a showing should be sufficient to 
authorize a plaintiff to enforce the prohibitions on discriminatory advertising.  
Even if courts impose an additional requirement that plaintiffs show they 
were “effectively deterred” by an ad, excluded users will often be able to satisfy 
it. Not informing people of a job opportunity is a highly effective barrier. If 
potential applicants are excluded from receiving a recruitment ad, it follows that 
the discriminatory nature of the ad—namely its targeting criteria—deterred them 
from applying. Users who were deliberately excluded from receiving a job 
posting and failed to apply should therefore be considered aggrieved parties 
entitled to sue under Section 704(b) or Section 623(e). 
A more difficult question is raised if a potential applicant, excluded from 
receiving targeted advertising, learns about the job through other means and 
applies. If she is required to show that she was effectively deterred, the fact that 
she applied may foreclose a discriminatory advertising claim, even if the 
employer has deliberately excluded users like her from receiving the ad on a 
 
 134. Id. at 9. 
 135. Id. at 1–2. 
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discriminatory basis. The employer might argue that because it used a variety of 
media to reach potential applicants, the fact that this particular plaintiff learned 
of the job opportunity means that she is not an aggrieved party. Such a result 
would be troubling, because even if that individual learned of the opportunity, 
members of the excluded group overall will be far less likely to become aware 
of it. The person who is in the best position to challenge the exclusionary 
advertising should not be precluded from doing so because she chose to apply 
anyway. Given the increasing significance of social media in the recruitment and 
hiring process, plaintiffs should be permitted to enforce the discriminatory 
advertising prohibitions so long as they have a genuine interest in the type of 
employment being advertised. 
Regardless of whether “effective deterrence” must be proven to bring a 
discriminatory advertising claim, a plaintiff who applies and is rejected may be 
able to pursue a discriminatory failure to hire claim. That possibility is discussed 
in the next section. 
B. Targeted Recruitment and Liability for Disparate Treatment or Disparate 
Impact 
The discriminatory advertising provisions in Title VII and the ADEA 
directly forbid unlawful ads, but, as seen in Part III above, employers’ 
advertising practices in the offline world have also been held to support claims 
of disparate treatment and disparate impact. Similar arguments can be made in 
the online world. Rejected job seekers may be able to point to an employer’s 
targeting strategy to show either that the employer intended to discriminate, or 
that its neutral advertising practices were in fact unlawfully screening out 
potential applicants along the lines of race, sex or other protected characteristics. 
Disparate treatment cases turn on employer intent, and therefore whether an 
employer’s online targeting strategy supports a finding of liability depends upon 
how clearly it indicates a discriminatory preference. If the employer expressly 
excludes some social media users from its target audience because of their 
protected characteristics, those choices strongly suggest that it intends to 
discourage members of those groups from applying. For example, if an employer 
directs its advertising only at men, or only at persons aged eighteen to thirty-
five, a court may infer that a female or older applicant was rejected because of 
the employer’s discriminatory motive. Less explicit strategies, such as selecting 
an audience using neutral attributes or relying on the lookalike audience tool, 
may not clearly indicate a discriminatory preference, making it more difficult to 
infer motive from these choices.  
Determining whether employer advertising provides evidence of intent in a 
disparate treatment case should closely parallel the analysis of whether the 
advertising is unlawful under Section 704(b) or Section 623(e). If the language 
of an ad and the context in which it is delivered indicate a “preference, limitation, 
specification, or discrimination” on a forbidden basis, then that advertisement 
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should also provide evidence of discriminatory motive. Conversely, ads that are 
not deemed unlawful under the advertising provisions should not be taken as 
proof of an employer’s intent. Although these questions—whether an 
advertisement expresses a discriminatory preference and whether it evidences a 
discriminatory motive—are parallel, disparate treatment liability will require 
additional proof. Publication of a discriminatory ad itself constitutes a violation 
under Section 704(b) and Section 623(e); however, disparate treatment liability 
also requires the plaintiff to show that she suffered an adverse employment 
action and that the decision was made on a discriminatory basis.  
When discriminatory effects result from targeting choices that rely on 
neutral attributes or the lookalike tool, it is less clear that those choices reflect a 
discriminatory motive. Without some evidence that the employer wanted to 
produce those effects, the observed bias may have occurred unintentionally. In 
such a situation, a disparate impact challenge would be more appropriate. 
In many ways, discriminatory online targeting fits well with past disparate 
impact cases. In City of Warren, discussed above, the court found that the City 
of Warren’s failure to publicize job openings outside all-white Macomb County 
gave rise to disparate impact liability. 136 By not publishing ads in newspapers 
with circulations in Detroit, which is located immediately adjacent, the City of 
Warren “produced a de factor barrier” for black applicants.137 Today, if an 
employer used the “location” screening feature on Facebook to direct its ads 
only at residents with zip codes in an overwhelmingly white county,138 the effect 
would be identical. Just as the court in City of Warren held that facially neutral 
advertising can violate Title VII, so too, courts today should find a disparate 
impact when employers target their recruitment ads using neutral attributes that 
disproportionately exclude users along the lines of race or other protected bases. 
In a similar fashion, the word-of-mouth recruitment cases suggest that when 
the lookalike audience tool has discriminatory effects, an employer may be liable 
for disparate impact. The word-of-mouth cases recognize that when a workforce 
is overwhelmingly white, reliance on informal methods of publicizing job 
opportunities will exclude nonwhites from applying for those positions, 
effectively discriminating against them.139 The lookalike audience feature is 
closely analogous to word-of-mouth recruiting. If an employer uses its current 
workforce, or some other set of people, as a source audience, and that set 
excludes certain demographic groups, the resulting lookalike audience is likely 
to similarly exclude those groups from receiving notice of job opportunities. 
 
 136. City of Warren, 138 F.3d at 1094. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Reach People in the Areas Where You Do Business, FACEBOOK BUSINESS, 
https://www.facebook.com/business/a/location-targeting [https://perma.cc/A53S-RQ4B] (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2018). 
 139. See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Cty. Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 925 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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Even though reliance on the lookalike tool may appear neutral, it may work “as 
effectively as any intentionally discriminatory policy”140 to perpetuate bias. Just 
as in the word-of-mouth cases, such an effect should be sufficient to show 
disparate impact. 
Of course, there will be complications and difficulties of proof in pursuing 
a disparate impact theory. For example, proof of a disproportionate impact has 
typically turned on statistical evidence of a disparity using workflow data. In a 
world in which employers micro-target their recruitment efforts and seek to 
identify “passive applicants,” disputes will arise about how to identify the 
relevant population against which any disproportionate impact should be 
measured. Employers will also argue that their targeted recruiting practices are 
justified. The responses of some employers to the allegations in the Bradley 
complaint are illustrative.141 One employer argued that age-based targeting was 
justified because it was the most cost-effective way of reaching individuals who 
were most likely to submit an application.142 Another argued that its age-targeted 
Facebook ads were “part of a broader recruitment strategy” and that it 
“advertises across many mediums” and hires on a nondiscriminatory basis.143 
Thus, employers will likely defend their practices on the grounds that their 
overall recruitment efforts, of which social media ads are only one part, do not 
discriminate against or hinder opportunities for anyone. 
Many questions remain to be worked out, such as what kind of statistical 
evidence will suffice to trigger scrutiny of an employer’s recruitment practices 
and what reasons are sufficient to justify those practices when they are 
systematically biased against disadvantaged groups. However, in answering 
those questions, courts should not mechanically apply the details of disparate 
impact doctrine as it has developed to meet other types of employer practices. 
As one of us has argued elsewhere, classification bias that results from data-
driven employment processes is not the same as the written ability tests or 
seniority systems that initially gave rise to the disparate impact doctrine.144 As 
a result, the doctrinal superstructure that has grown up around disparate impact 
theory does not quite fit the challenges posed by new technologies for sorting 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Jeff Larson et al., These Are the Job Ads You Can’t See on Facebook If You’re Older, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2017), http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/facebook-job-ads [https://per 
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 142. A spokesperson for Goldman Sachs defended limiting distribution of its ads about entry 
level positions to people eighteen to sixty-four because those sixty-five and older are more likely 
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increasing the yield of applicants. Angwin et al., supra note 1. 
 143. Statement by UPS. See Larson et al., supra note 143. 
 144. See, Kim, supra note 47, at 907–09. See also Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact 
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and screening workers.145 The theory of disparate impact certainly applies—
namely the idea that some practices that are neutral on their face can nevertheless 
have discriminatory effects. Where those practices constitute arbitrary barriers 
to job opportunities for disadvantaged groups, they ought to be forbidden. The 
details of how that theory ought to be applied to specific situations, however, 
needs to be adjusted given that practices like targeted online advertising are quite 
different from the context in which disparate impact doctrine first developed. 
As explained in earlier work, there is ample room in Title VII’s text for 
developing an effective response to new forms of discrimination.146 In 1991, 
Congress codified disparate impact doctrine in Section 703(k) of the statute, but 
it left intact the language of Section 703(a)(2), which makes it unlawful for an 
employer to “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants . . . in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities” because of race, sex or other protected characteristic.147 New 
technologies like targeted online recruitment operate precisely by classifying 
applicants in ways that “tend to deprive” some of them of employment 
opportunities, and when those classifications coincide with protected class lines 
they run afoul of the prohibition in Section 703(a)(2). While existing disparate 
impact doctrine is captured in Section 703(k), the prohibitions in Section 
703(a)(2) arguably continue to have independent force,148 providing room for 
the development of doctrine that can more closely respond to the challenges 
posed by technologically-driven forms of exclusion, such as those that can occur 
with targeted online recruitment. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The ability to precisely target which types of people will receive 
employment ads online is transforming how companies recruit new employees. 
By leveraging the vast amounts of data available about social media users, 
employers can reach a broader range of qualified candidates more efficiently. 
However, relying on extensive personal data to target the recipients of online 
job ads also risks sorting people in ways that exclude already disadvantaged 
groups from receiving critical information about job opportunities. The legal 
issues raised by online recruiting are not entirely novel. Existing anti-
discrimination law offers some tools for addressing the more blatant forms of 
discriminatory advertising. However, online recruiting is not the same as the old 
help-wanted ads in the newspapers, and so, if the law is to effectively combat 
systematic disadvantage and inequality in a data-driven world, it will have to 
evolve as well. 
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